# A 30-minute email authentication audit for your domain

> A timed checklist to audit SPF, DKIM, DMARC and transport security on any domain, with the commands to run and what a passing answer looks like.

- Published: 2026-08-29
- Author: Koltrix Team
- Category: Guides
- Source: https://koltrix.com/blog/email-auth-audit-30-minutes

You do not need a consultant or a paid scanner to find out whether a domain's email authentication is in good shape. Half an hour, a terminal and one test message will surface nearly every problem worth fixing.

Here is the audit we run, broken into timed blocks, with what a passing answer looks like at each step.

## Before you start (2 minutes)

Gather three things:

- **The domain** you are auditing, plus any subdomains you know send mail (bounce domains, marketing subdomains).
- **A recent message** from each system that sends as the domain, saved with full headers. If you do not have one, trigger a password reset or a notification to yourself.
- **A terminal** with `dig`, `curl` and `openssl`.

Write down findings as you go in three buckets: broken (fix this week), weak (fix this quarter), and fine.

## Minutes 0 to 5: SPF

```bash
dig +short TXT example.com | grep -i 'v=spf1'
```

Check:

1. **Exactly one record.** Two or more is a permerror on every check. Broken.
2. **Ends in `~all` or `-all`.** `+all` or `?all` is broken; a missing `all` is weak.
3. **Nothing after `all`.** Terms after it are never evaluated.
4. **Lookup count.** Walk each `include:` and tally `include`, `a`, `mx`, `ptr`, `exists` and `redirect` across the tree. Over ten is broken; eight to ten is weak, because the next vendor will push it over.
5. **No dead includes.** An include that returns no record wastes a lookup and counts toward the two-void-lookup limit.

Repeat for every bounce subdomain you know about.

## Minutes 5 to 10: DKIM

Open each saved message and find the DKIM-Signature headers. Note the `d=` domain, the `s=` selector and the `a=` algorithm. Then:

```bash
dig +short TXT k1._domainkey.example.com
```

Check:

1. **The key exists** at the selector. No answer is broken.
2. **The `d=` domain is yours** or a subdomain of yours. A vendor's own domain means the signature cannot align for DMARC. Weak now, broken once you enforce DMARC.
3. **The algorithm is `rsa-sha256`** (or `ed25519-sha256` as an additional signature). `rsa-sha1` is broken.
4. **The key is at least 2048 bits.** A short `p=` value, about 216 characters, suggests 1024-bit. Weak.
5. **No `l=` tag** in the signature. Its presence lets content be appended to signed mail. Weak to broken.

To check key length precisely, decode the key with `openssl`, as covered in our post on publishing 2048-bit keys.

## Minutes 10 to 15: DMARC

```bash
dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com
```

Check:

1. **A record exists** and starts with `v=DMARC1`. Missing is broken if you send any volume to Gmail or Yahoo, since both require DMARC from bulk senders.
2. **The policy.** `p=none` is acceptable while you are monitoring, but it provides no protection; note how long it has been there. `quarantine` or `reject` is the goal.
3. **Subdomain coverage.** Does `sp=none` leave subdomains exposed? Is `np` set for non-existent subdomains?
4. **Reporting.** Is there a `rua=mailto:` address, and is someone actually reading the reports? An unread report mailbox is weak.
5. **Obsolete tags.** `pct`, `rf` and `ri` were removed in RFC 9989. Harmless but worth cleaning up.

If `rua` points to another domain, check the authorization record at `example.com._report._dmarc.<that-domain>`.

## Minutes 15 to 20: the test message verdict

Read the Authentication-Results header that your own mailbox provider added to each saved message.

```text
Authentication-Results: mx.receiver.example;
  spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=bounce.example.com;
  dkim=pass header.d=example.com header.s=k1;
  dmarc=pass header.from=example.com
```

For each sending system, confirm `dmarc=pass`, and identify which mechanism provided the aligned pass. A message passing DMARC only through SPF is fragile, because forwarding breaks SPF. Every stream should ideally have aligned DKIM.

Also look for:

- `spf=permerror` or `temperror` with a reason in parentheses.
- `dkim=fail (body hash did not verify)`, which means something modifies messages after signing.
- One-click unsubscribe headers on marketing mail: `List-Unsubscribe` with an HTTPS URL plus `List-Unsubscribe-Post: List-Unsubscribe=One-Click`, which Gmail and Yahoo require for bulk marketing and subscribed mail.

## Minutes 20 to 25: transport and infrastructure

```bash
dig +short MX example.com
dig +short TXT _mta-sts.example.com
dig +short TXT _smtp._tls.example.com
dig +short -x 192.0.2.25
```

Check:

1. **MX records** resolve to hostnames with address records. A domain that never receives mail should have a null MX (`0 .`).
2. **MTA-STS** exists, and the policy at `https://mta-sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt` lists the current MX hosts. Missing is weak; a policy that lists old MX hosts in enforce mode is broken.
3. **TLS-RPT** exists, so TLS failures get reported to you.
4. **Reverse DNS.** For any IP you operate that sends mail, the PTR hostname resolves back to the same IP. If you only send through providers, they handle this.

## Minutes 25 to 30: the domains you forgot

List every domain the organization owns, including old brands and defensive registrations. For each one that should never send mail, check for the lockdown set:

| Record | Expected value |
|---|---|
| MX | `0 .` |
| SPF | `v=spf1 -all` |
| DMARC | `v=DMARC1; p=reject` |

Missing lockdown records on a parked domain is weak; those domains are attractive for spoofing because they genuinely belong to you.

## Turning findings into a plan

Sort the findings by bucket and assign owners:

- **Broken items** usually take minutes to fix once found: merge a duplicate SPF record, publish a missing DKIM key, remove `+all`.
- **Weak items** are projects: rotating to 2048-bit keys, moving vendors to aligned DKIM, rolling DMARC toward enforcement, deploying MTA-STS.
- **Fine items** go on a quarterly re-check list.

Repeat the audit every quarter and after any change to sending vendors, mailbox providers or DNS hosting. It gets faster each time because the inventory already exists.

## Key takeaways

- Thirty minutes covers SPF, DKIM, DMARC, a real-message verdict, transport security and parked domains.
- Real message headers are essential; DNS alone cannot tell you which selectors and envelope domains are in use.
- Classify each finding as broken, weak or fine, and fix broken items immediately.
- Every sending stream should pass DMARC through aligned DKIM, not only SPF.
- Re-run the audit quarterly and after any vendor or DNS change.
